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A
s the size and complexity of
Canada’s taxation regime have
grown, so too has the role of
the tax collection bureaucracy. For the
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), this
expansion has had unforeseen
consequences for its administration of
non-taxable entities. 
The CRA now finds itself with a conflicting
mandate: to protect the tax base while regulating
charities that subtract from the base because of the
donation tax credit.1This structure arose for legal
and historical reasons as the unintended result of
interplay among the Constitution, Parliament’s
desire to protect the integrity of the donation tax
credit system, and the general lack of regulation in
the sector. Over time, as the lack of sector regulation
became a greater cause for public concern, the CRA
stepped in as the de facto regulator of charities in
the public interest. 
The current registration system and the tax
authorities that administer it are ill suited to regulate
charities. In addition, as the federal government
lacks the jurisdiction to regulate the sector properly,
charities must work in a system that is forced to do
a job for which it was not designed, its components
added in response to particular pressures. The better
way is a comprehensive and flexible system that
proactively involves the provinces and that is
enforced by a government agency with the expertise
for such work. Assuming Canadians wish to nurture
and grow the charitable sector, the need for a
regulatory system with vision, a well-trained
workforce, and a well-defined mandate in which
charities are not simply a tangential offshoot, 
should be obvious. 
The origins of the current situation can be traced
back to the Constitution Act, 1867,2 which grants
authority for the regulation of charities to the
provinces. Thus, the federal government has been
unable to set up either a legislative regime or an
administrative process with which to regulate the
sector directly. The provinces, however, generally
have not exercised their authority, leaving the federal
government, through the CRA, to enter the field by
requiring that charities comply with certain
requirements for registration under the Income Tax
Act (ITA)3 – requirements that likely would be
unconstitutional if enacted as a separate regulation
regime. Thus, as a technical matter, the federal
government’s registration system is understood not
to be an infringement upon provincial powers
because it is a function of the income tax system’s
registration mechanism, rather than outright
regulation. Although the provinces have not
objected to this incursion, the regime’s legitimacy is
impaired by their lack of input into the federal
government’s regulatory attempts. For charities, the
situation has led to mounting discontent with the
current system’s institutional focus.4
This discontent is multifaceted. One major area
of concern is with how the common law definition
of “charity” is stagnating. Some question the need
for evolution at all, but such a view ignores the role
that charities now play in confronting the world’s
ills. The definition must evolve to allow new
charities to be created that can meet the challenges
as they arise.5The current stagnation problems with
the definition of charity and the reliance on the
common law to evolve that definition have been the
subject of many scholarly pieces. Recognizing the
issue, the CRA has taken upon itself the role of
evolving the definition through the use of
administrative policies. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the definition of charity is a legal question, and
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The author wishes to thank and acknowledge Arthur B.C. Drache Q.C. C.M. for his insight and the benefit of his experience in preparing this
paper, and Professor Richard Jochelson of the University of Manitoba for his comments with respect to the constitutional elements of this paper.
Of course, any errors are solely the responsibility of the author.
1 Under the Income Tax Act only individual donors are eligible for a credit while corporate donors receive a deduction. As the net effect on the
tax base is the same (although to varying degrees), I do not distinguish between them and refer to them collectively as the donation tax credit.
2 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, s. 92(7) reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II., No. 5.
3  R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1.
4  Over the years, a series of articles in the Canadian Not for Profit News has reflected this mood.
5 Before her elevation to the Supreme Court of Canada, Bertha Wilson wrote that it was crucial that we “become sensitive to the role of private
philanthropy in the drive for social progress” (Wilson [1972] “By Way of Introduction” … 1997, 5). should not to be decided by administrative policy
by an organization whose jurisdiction to do so is
questionable. Thus, while not originally a problem
of the registration system, the definitional issue has
become part of it. And leaving aside questions
about the solution to the definition problem, there
is a major issue regarding the involvement of the
CRA in the process of charity regulation which
deserves further scrutiny. Other areas of
dissatisfaction stem from the fundamental problem
that arises when the CRA, as the administrator of
fiscal policy, attempts to regulate charities which are
effectively creatures of social policy. When the
agency goes beyond its general mandate and seeks,
for example, to determine the appropriate level of
political involvement by charities, or the definition
of “religion,” or whether a charity’s activities are
effectively fulfilling its purpose, the agency exceeds
its design and the implementation of the charitible
agenda becomes frustrated. 
This frustration with the regulator and the
general regulatory regime has been recognized in
several high-profile reports. The most notable of
these were published in the 1990s after two sets of
public consultations: the Broadbent Report
(Broadbent 1999) and the report of the Joint
Regulatory Table (1999), part of the Voluntary
Sector Initiative, and two reports commissioned by
the Department of Canadian Heritage and the
Kahanoff Foundation (Drache and Boyle 1998;
Drache and Hunter 2000).6 All of these projects
concluded that – indeed, some began with – the
principle that Canada’s current system for
administering charities was untenable and that
change was necessary.
There would be ample reason to re-examine 
the regime in any case, even in the absence of
discontent with the CRA’s administration of the
sector. From the constitutional perspective, any
system in which the federal government plays 
the predominant role in charity regulation is less
than wholly legitimate.7 More important, the
Constitution’s limits on the federal government’s
ability to regulate the sector properly ill serves
Canadians as the charitable sector grows in size
and influence.8 What is needed is a new regulator
that provides a stronger framework for the
development of new charities, that regulates
charities through a comprehensive regime, and
that resolves disputes in a way that serves both
the interests of justice and the welfare of the
sector and that of the public it serves.
Ultimately, however, short of a constitutional
amendment, these concerns can be addressed only
by convincing the provinces to exercise their
jurisdiction and – as a harmonized system of rules
is clearly in the interests of Canadians – to act in 
a coordinated manner. One approach to this end
would be for the federal government to bring the
provinces to the table in a joint federal-provincial
charity council that would assume responsibility
for registering charities. Such a council would
advance the common law definition of charity,
regulate non-tax-related aspects of the charity
system, adjudicate disputes over a charity’s
qualifications for registration, and ensure
compliance with the council’s rules. The CRA
would retain jurisdiction over the tax components
of operating as a charity – most notably, the
receipting of charitable gifts. The goal is a system
where governments enact laws to directly create
results and bureaucratic mechanisms to enforce
them are dedicated to that purpose. 
Background
Constitutional Authority
Canada inherited its charity law system from the
United Kingdom upon the promulgation of the
British North America Act (now the Constitution Act,
1867). The Act itself provides that:
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6 In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that Arthur Drache has reviewed this paper and that the author is associated with Mr. Drache
at the law firm of Drache – Tax, Estates & Charity Law.
7 I argue later in this paper, however, that the federal government might indeed have some jurisdiction over charities that operate interprovincially.
8 According to Statistics Canada, the voluntary sector is made up of approximately 81,000 non-profit organizations, 83,000 registered charities,
and 73,000 small grassroots organizations. Total assets of registered charities alone are in the billions of dollars.| 3 Commentary 300
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In each Province the Legislature may exclusively
make Laws in relation to Matters coming within
the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter
enumerated; that is to say,
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and
Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities,
and Eleemosynary9 Institutions in and for the
Province, other than Marine Hospitals. 
At Confederation, there was neither an income tax
credit nor deduction for donations to charity.
Indeed, there was no income tax, and so the main
effect of this clause was to devolve to provincial
attorneys general the Crown’s traditional role of
protecting charitable property. Included in this role
was the general duty to determine what qualified as
charitable and, if necessary, to regulate the sector.
On the other hand, constitutional authority to levy
an income tax is part of the shared federal and
provincial jurisdiction. Thus, the federal
government has authority to register organizations
that qualify as charities for special tax benefits
under the ITA. As a matter of practicality, most
provinces have delegated the collection of their
portion of the income tax to the federal
government. Since the two levels of government
share this power, there is no legal issue with the
delegation of the collection power from one level.
The same is not true of the charity regulation
power, however, so the federal government’s
ostensible regulation of charities is exceptional 
and should be re-examined.10
Development of the ITA
Canada’s first income tax act, the Income War Tax
Act, 1917,11 included both an exemption from
income tax and a deduction for donations by
taxpayers to certain wartime charities. This
deduction was later changed to a tax credit and
expanded to include all charities. The term
“charity” was never defined in the statute, however,
but left to the common law.12 In fact, during the
parliamentary debates in 1930 over the genesis of
the current donation tax credit system, opposition
parties were resolute in their resistance to the
federal government’s having the discretion to
determine which charities were eligible for
preferential treatment.13This left the definition, 
as it is today, with the common law.
Taken together with the ability to create new
charities at will, the tax deduction system at the
time stood open to abuse by taxpayers’ claims for
donations to causes whose charitable nature (or
existence) was doubtful. In 1967, in an attempt to
stymie such abuse, the system was changed so that
only donations to organizations registered as
charities with the federal government (and
necessarily approved by it) could qualify for the
preferential tax treatment (see Drache, Hayhoe, 
and Stevens 2007). The provinces, meanwhile, had
made little effort to exert their constitutional
authority and legislate a definition of “charity” or
otherwise regulate the sector. Had they done so, the
federal provision to register charities might have
been unnecessary; in the absence of movement on
their part, the federal government seized the
opportunity to provide the framework under which
charities would come to be regulated.
9 Of, relating to, or supported by charity.
10 The CRA itself notes that, although it has no real jurisdiction to regulate fundraising, it will take account of “inappropriate” fundraising in
determining a charity’s registered status (Canada 2009c, 2). In this way, the CRA is assuming the role of regulator of charities in the public
interest despite the limited tools and jurisdiction at its disposal.
11 (Can.), 7-8 Geo. 5, c.28.
12 The ITA also studiously avoids defining “charity.” The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that lack of a legislated definition of “charity” is not
accidental: “[T]he fact that the ITA does not define ‘charitable,’ leaving it instead to the tests enunciated by the common law, indicates the desire
of Parliament to limit the class of charitable organizations to the relatively restrictive categories available under the landmark Pemsel case which
serves as the foundation of modern charity law and the subsequent case law. This can be seen as reflecting the preferred tax policy” (Vancouver
Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v M.N.R., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10).
13 House of Commons Debates (1930) 16th Parliament, 4th Session, Vol. III, Sess. 2513-19.| 4 Commentary 300
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Decisions and Disputes
THE CHARITIES DIRECTORATE: As the ITA is by far
the largest single source of codified charity law in
Canada – and the CRA is the administrator of the
ITA, the CRA has become by default the regulator
of the entire charitable sector. Indeed, the CRA
states quite openly that it is the “regulator of
registered charities in Canada” (Canada 2008). The
branch of the CRA tasked with enforcing the
provisions of the ITA pertaining to charity
regulation is the Charities Directorate (see Figure
1). Since the imposition of the registration system
in 1967, the federal government has legislated a
significant regulatory regime that goes well beyond
simple registration of charities to include such areas
as political advocacy,14 charitable disbursements,15
fundraising activities,16 and even whether specific
practices qualify as religion.17 Indeed, some of the
CRA’s administrative efforts border on social
engineering.18Thus, the Directorate has grown
from simply registering charities to playing a large
role in the development of the charities sector. This
is encompassed in the mission statement the
Directorate has chosen for itself: “Our mission is to
promote compliance with the income tax
legislation and regulations relating to charities
through education, quality service, and responsible
enforcement, thereby contributing to the integrity
of the charitable sector and the social well-being of
Canadians” (Canada 2009a).
There are, however, major structural problems
with continuing to allow the Directorate, as a
branch of the CRA, to administer the charities
sector.19To begin with, there is a direct and
obvious conflict of interest created when the
organization responsible for maintaining the
integrity of the national tax base is also responsible
for registering and policing non-taxable entities that
are capable of detracting from the tax base. This
conflict was recognized explicitly in the Broadbent
Report in the context of the registration of new
charities: “Revenue Canada, by most accounts, has
tended to be restrictive in its use of the concept, as
one would expect of a tax-raising department”
(Broadbent 1999, 70).20 More generally, as
protector of the tax base, the CRA has a direct
incentive to stymie the development of new
charitable areas.
The institutional conflict of interest has practical
implications that affect charities when the CRA uses
the Directorate to target charities involved in tax
practices of which the CRA disapproves.21 For
example, the Directorate has threatened to revoke
charitable registrations for improper T4 issuance,
when other penalties exist for this express purpose.22
More publicly, it has targeted charities that accept
donations as part of aggressive tax sheltering,
regardless of the severity of wrongdoing on the part
of the charities.23 Another example is the Redeemer
Foundation case,24 where the Directorate used the
audit of a charity to obtain a list of donors in order
to issue reassessments against them.
14 One CRA document notes that it “seeks to clarify the extent to which charities can usefully contribute to the development of public policy under
the existing law” (Canada 2003).
15 See, for example, Canada (1998).
16 See, for example, Canada (2009c).
17 See, for, example Canada (2002), where the CRA must decide if a given belief system qualifies as a religion.
18 See, for example, Canada (2005, 2009b) and a soon-to-be-released CRA consultation paper on the definition of religion.
19 One should note that the Directorate is not a legally established entity and has no separate mandate or purpose from that of the CRA. See
Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c.17, ss. 5(1).
20 This view was originally voiced in the report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Canada 1966, 132).
21 The propriety of this strategy must be divorced from the propriety of the plans being targeted. For a sense of this strategy, see Canada (2000b).
22 Indeed, auditors are directed to review these transactions during audits of charities’ operations – see Technical Operations Manual 1454.2(10),
available through Access to Information. Findings of such improper use, however, should not lead to revocation.
23 See, for example, Canada (2009d), which warns about receiving inflated receipts from charities.
24 Redeemer Foundation v Canada (National Revenue), 2008 SCC 46.The discussion of which practices are appropriate
for the CRA to use in enforcing the ITA against
charities is reflective of the general questions about
the mandate of the Charities Directorate. Many in
the sector believe that the Directorate’s purpose
should be to promote the interests of charities and
the work they do – indeed, the Directorate
encourages this view – but how can a body protect
and nurture the charitable sector while enforcing
the ITA and protecting the tax base? Few
Canadians would argue with the importance of
nurturing the charitable sector. Moreover, this
laudable goal is within reach, as both the Broadbent
Report and the Joint Regulatory Table have shown,
but it requires separating the charity regulation role
from the ITA enforcement role in a concrete and
formal fashion.
Perhaps obviously, regulation of the charitable
sector requires knowledge, training and experience
particular to this area. It is unrealistic and unfair to
expect Directorate officials hired by the CRA, and
who must generally fill positions related to
collecting taxes, to have the requisite skills to
regulate charities. This is particularly true as CRA
employees tend to move between different CRA
departments with some frequency, if for no other
reason than career advancement. Thus, assignment
to the Directorate can be career limiting and, unless
the individual has a strong commitment to the
charitable sector, he or she will be obliged to leave
the Directorate for greater career options. To some
degree this situation exists in all large organizations
but the incentive to leave the Directorate has
created a dearth of very senior charity law
professionals within the Directorate.
Perhaps of more concern is that Directorate
employees are responsible for social policy decision-
making because of their ostensible power to
regulate the sector. Canadians should be thankful
that the Directorate takes the job seriously, but it is
entirely inappropriate for the taxing authority to
turn its collective mind to (among other things) the
definition of religion, the charitable nature of
amateur sport, or whether a charity has engaged in
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Figure 1: Current Structure of the Charities Directorate
Source: Adapted from Canada 2009a. | 6 Commentary 300
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political activity or advocated a “controversial”
subject.25The Broadbent Report recognized the
same problem in the context of the political
advocacy rules: 
It is up to the discretion of Revenue Canada to
determine which political activities are
considered acceptable and whether permissible
levels of activity have been exceeded. A 1998
decision by the Federal Court of Appeal in the
Human Life International case has further
restricted the definition of permissible advocacy
activity, however, by stating that “activities
designed essentially to sway public opinion on a
controversial social issue are not charitable but
are political.” This interpretation gives even
greater discretion to Revenue Canada because it
will define what is a controversial social issue and
potentially further control advocacy activities.... 
Given that public policy advocacy is closely
linked to the core mission of many voluntary
organizations, it may seem strange to address
issues of advocacy in the context of the regulation
of financial management. Advocacy is regulated,
however, by limiting the amount of an
organization’s resources that can be spent on
it.…In our view, the ten percent rule is badly
formulated, poorly understood and potentially
highly arbitrary in its application by Revenue
Canada. An inappropriate political burden is
placed on tax officials. (Broadbent 1999, 86-87.)
The application of non-tax decisions should be
reserved for elected officials and for public servants
with specific expertise and delegated authority in the
area. Do we really want unelected tax bureaucrats to
be responsible for such social decisions?26
THE APPEALS BRANCH: In 2005, the Charities
Redress Section (CRS) of the Appeals Branch was
opened to provide a review of Directorate decisions
upon application by a charity or proposed charity.
The CRS is meant to be staffed by individuals
versed in the mechanics of charity law and able to
take a sober second look at a file before it proceeds
to court. Given its relative newness, however, it 
is difficult to assess the branch’s operations.
Nevertheless, its structure and place within the
CRA framework raise many of the same doubts
that are expressed about the Directorate, such as 
the qualifications of tax officials to make charity
law and social policy decisions and the indepen-
dence of the branch from the greater pressures of
the CRA’s larger role as protector of the tax base.
Indeed, the mandate of the Charities Redress
Section is to assess whether Directorate decisions
conform to general CRA policy.
THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL: While the
Constitution originally mandated that disputes over
charity issues be heard in the provincial courts, the
effective takeover of the area by the ITA has redirected
the hearing of these types of cases through an ill-
adapted version of the dispute resolution system used
by private taxpayers. If the CRS confirms a
Directorate decision, the charity can appeal the
confirmation to the court level. Appeals of decisions
regarding registration, revocation, or annulment
proceed directly to the Federal Court of Appeal
(FCA), (as opposed to a lower division of the federal
court system), whereas appeals of decisions regarding
so-called intermediate sanctions proceed to the Tax
Court of Canada.
The FCA’s jurisdiction is generally to hear matters
involving the federal government at the appellate
level. As registration of charities was included in the
federal ITA, it was inevitable that the FCA would
become the country’s most important court for
charities (as opposed to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which picks the cases it hears). This is
unfortunate, for three reasons. First, the FCA is
designed to be an appellate-level court, meaning that
no oral testimony is heard and all evidence is
presented in the form of written documentation, so
that litigants who do not retain experienced
representation until late in the dispute resolution
process – or at all – often have a file that is not
documented properly. Second, it can be particularly
difficult to present the charitable nature of an
25 Religious charities were so concerned about CRA activism in the social arena that they prevailed upon Parliament to include a provision in the
ITA that charities could not be deregistered for refusing to perform same-sex marriages. See R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1., ss.149.1(6.21).
26 Moreover, the potential for misuse and bias abounds, as the CRA itself has admitted; see, for example, Canada (1999). 27 Unlike the FCA, some courts have relaxed rules of evidence and allow self-represented litigants. Moreover, as an appellate-level court, the FCA
has rules of procedure that are arguably more complex and require a trained advocate to navigate successfully.
28 See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v Bradco Construction Ltd., 1993 CanLII 88 (S.C.C.), [1993] 2 S.C.R.
316, at p. 335, cited with approval in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para.50, for
evidence of this situation.
29 See Fuaran Foundation v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency) (2004), 10 E.T.R. (3d) 26 (FCA) and Hostelling International Canada – Ontario
East Region v MNR 2008 FCA 396.
30 For some recognition of this by the CRA, see Canada (2009c).
31 See R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1., ss 149.1(6.1) and (6.2).
32 Attempts to involve the provinces in charity governance are not new. Plans were announced in 2000 to ask each province to appoint a
representative to a board of management; the plan failed but it is not clear why. See Canada (2000a).
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organization without oral testimony – think of the
difficulty of proving that a soup kitchen is charitable
on the basis of documents alone. Finally, the FCA is
simply not user friendly for a small local charity that
lacks the funds to appeal to what some regard as the
second-highest court in the land.27
It is somewhat unusual that the FCA is the court of
first instance – that is, the first level of court to hear a
matter – for appeals of CRA decisions regarding
registration, revocation, and annulment of charitable
status. It is apparently a result of Parliament’s belief
that appeals of CRA decisions were similar to appeals
of other administrative bodies – such as the
Competition Tribunal, the Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunications Commission, and the
Canadian Transportation Agency – that deal
primarily with factual matters decided by experts and
that also go directly to the FCA. As a matter of
principle, however, the FCA tends to grant a degree
of deference to such tribunals, on the basis that
Parliament has a policy reason for appointing experts,
rather than judges, to sit on them.28This is not to say
that the FCA simply rubber stamps Directorate
decisions, but that Directorate decisions are subjected
to a standard of reasonableness rather than the stricter
standard of correctness.29This attitude of deference
seems to have been extended to CRA decisions on
charity law matters, even though the CRA is accorded
no such deference with respect to general tax matters
(see Chan 2008) and its rulings on the registration of
charities are prima facie matters of law rather than of
fact. The combined effect of a court that does not
hear oral testimony and a generally deferential
attitude to CRA findings is a barrier that any charity
would find difficult to overcome.
Involving the Provinces
The constitutional limitation on the federal
government’s involvement in the charitable area has
forced it to disguise its regulation of the area as
conditions of registration.30 Unfortunately, the ITA
is limited in how far it reasonably can be stretched to
encompass regulation under the rubric of
registration, in two ways. First, it is often too blunt a
tool to use on topics that require a detailed set of
rules – on the undertaking of political activities, for
example, the Income Tax Act contains only broad
constructs.31 Second, not every offence can be
codified as a regulation of a charity. For example, the
current rules punish charities whose directors misuse
charitable property. As a matter of justice, it is the
guilty parties (the directors) who should be
punished, not the victim (the charity), but punishing
directors is clearly a provincial power and cannot be
dealt with as part of the registration system.
Although provincial abdication of the charity
sphere led to the current federal regulation, inertia
itself is now a disincentive for the provinces to assert
their jurisdiction.32 After all, if the federal govern-
ment is legislating in the area, why should the
provinces bother, particularly as it does not bring in
any additional tax revenue? Such a view is, however,
short sighted: charities might not bring in revenue
but they certainly redirect revenue away from
provincial coffers and take on social functions that
would have otherwise have fallen to the provinces.
More important, since charities that provide supple-
mental funding in areas of provincial responsibility,
such as health and education, receive a dispropor-
tionately large share of government funding (see
Table 1), there should be sufficient incentive to
ensure their proper regulation and growth. As well,
since the federal government’s retention of sole33 The provincial tax deduction/credit for donations is not part of the scheme to regulate charities.
34 Notably the Charities Accounting Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.10.
35 To be fair, the Office of the Public Trustee has exercised this power in relatively few instances.
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discretion to register such organizations gives it a
significant degree of control over the spending of
their funds, it would be appropriate for the
provinces to assume a greater role in determining
how the funds are spent.
The jurisdiction of provincial attorneys general
over charities initially arose from their responsibility
to protect charitable property. This duty exists to
this day, even though the provinces, with the
exception of Ontario and relatively minor
enactments elsewhere, are almost wholly absent
from the field. The ITA, however, places the CRA
in the exact opposite position to this duty of the
Crown in that its fines, which are part of the Act’s
“intermediate sanctions,” effectively attack a
charity’s property. Given that the CRA has assumed
for itself the mantle of regulator of charities in the
public interest, it is singularly incongruous that the
ITA should force it to seize charitable property to
satisfy a punishment in this manner.
CURRENT PROVINCIAL INVOLVEMENT: Although
regulation of charities is clearly within their
jurisdiction, the provinces – with Ontario as a
notable exception – have abandoned any serious
regulation of charitable operations.33 Piecemeal
statutes, however, govern a variety of smaller issues.
So, for example, while no significant statutes detail
appropriate charities’ administration costs,
spending requirements, political activities, or
extraprovincial operations, the provinces generally
provide limited direction on issues such as
fundraising, telemarketing, and property taxes.
Some provinces also have more specific rules on
extraprovincial fundraising. Quebec, as usual,
asserts its jurisdiction in this area, an exercise that
merely mirrors the rules of the ITA rather than any
particular Quebec policy towards charities. 
The notable exception among the provinces is
Ontario, which has passed several laws relating to
charities,34 and the Office of the Public Trustee has
authority to oversee the charity regime. It also
enforces the common law fiduciary responsibilities
of directors – duties that are applicable to directors
in every province but that only Ontario makes any
serious attempt to enforce.35 Ironically, given the
inactivity of most provinces, a degree of efficiency
has been achieved in the regulation of the sector in
that national charities have not been forced to
comply with different regulatory regimes in each
province. Nevertheless, the fact that charities would
have to comply with provincial regulations cannot
serve as a reason not to enact any; even if the result
would be a different charity regime in each
province, it arguably would be more beneficial to
the sector than is the current situation.
Table 1: Total Charity Revenue by Government Source, 2003
Source: Statistics Canada 2004.
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(percent)36 For example, the registration system originally was implemented to curtail abuses arising from the donations to groups that simply assumed the
title of “charity.”
37 Bob Wyatt is executive director of the Muttart Foundation, an organization dedicated to improving operations in the charity sector; he was also
the co-chair of the Joint Regulatory Table.
38 Miller (1999) criticizes the report as nothing more than a way for the sector to attempt to re-establish the confidence of the public in its
regulation without undertaking fundamental reform.
39 When the Broadbent Report was first circulated for comment, it contained three suggestions for a new regulatory regime, so clearly the idea had
some support even ten years ago. Since then, history has served only to strengthen the saliency of this idea.
40  April, Clemens, and Francis (1999) strongly criticize the Broadbent Report’s final recommendation, pointing out that the proposed Voluntary
Sector Commission – essentially to advise the CRA and facilitate a better relationship between charities and the CRA – could be accomplished
through better and more cost-effective means. They do suggest, however, that, it might be useful to have an independent body composed of
people with legal expertise that could make recommendations to the CRA regarding the charitable definition or hear appeals of CRA decisions.
In 2002, the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy (now Imagine Canada) and the now-defunct IMPACS (Institute for Media, Policy, and Civil
Society) launched an unsuccessful campaign to change the definition of charity-related political activities; see IMPACS and Canadian Centre for
Philanthropy (2002).
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Policy Justifications of the Current System
The regime for regulating charities in Canada is, in
large part, a result of the attempt to address various
policy concerns that have arisen from time to time
regarding the sector.36These additions have been
forced into a system of fundamental tension
between the desire to have a standardized system of
regulation for charities across the country and the
constitutional impediments to such a system.
Indeed, as Bob Wyatt37 notes, “the lack of
development of charity law is, at once, complex and
entirely simple. The complexity comes from a
regulatory environment developed to fit a
dysfunctional constitutional and legal arrangement
for the supervision and regulation of charities”
(Wyatt 2009).
Thus, a major policy justification for the current
regime is that, with various degrees of efficiency, it
has solved many of the problems that once beset
the sector. While a single, standardized set of rules
was never a direct aim of the system, it is surely
more efficient than having a separate regulatory
regime in each province, and it is a powerful reason
to involve the federal government as the unifying
factor in any future regulatory regime change.
Indeed, provincial inaction has avoided the kinds of
problems corporations face in, say, securities
regulation, where complying with a separate regime
in each province can be expensive, onerous, and
time consuming. In the case of charities, one could
imagine that having a differing regime in each
province might result in either the diminution of
national charities into provincial ones or the
outright flouting of provincial laws.
Past Proposals for Reform
The Broadbent Report, while recognizing some of
these problems, limited itself to recommendations
on specific policy changes that would benefit
charities without changing the regime that
currently exists. This relatively tame suggestion was
likely a product of several factors. As the report
scarcely mentions constitutional difficulties, it is
likely they were seen as insurmountable,38 and the
recommendations basically preserve the status quo
with the exception of the charitable definition
(albeit with the call for a new agency to educate and
encourage compliance).39 With respect to the
definitional issue, the report suggests that
Parliament should legislate an all-encompassing
definition rather than rely on the Directorate and
the courts to do so.40
The Joint Regulatory Table’s final recommendations
also attempted to address many of the same problems,
but remained within the current structural status quo.
For example, it suggested that policy guidelines be
constructed regarding the regulator’s ability to extend
the common law; that the regulator encourage the
provinces to make appropriate legislative change and
to coordinate with Ottawa; and that the federal41 The Ontario Law Reform Commission (1996) also cited the British Charity Commission as an excellent model but lamented its impossibility in
Canada due to constitutional difficulties, holding that a different charity body would be required in each province. Instead, the Commission
endorsed change only at the federal level. It recognized that such changes could make the entire charitable registration scheme a function of tax
considerations (and bifurcate the charitable definition along federal-provincial lines) but suggested that both risks could be managed.
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minister should work with the appropriate provincial
ministers. It also proposed importing some of the
practices of the British Charities Commission.41
Without addressing the constitutional question,
however, such recommendations can only go so far
in improving the regulatory system. 
Two reports commissioned by the Department of
Canadian Heritage and the Kahanoff Foundation
(Drache 1998; Drache and Hunter 2000), while
explicitly recognizing the constitutional difficulties,
limited their recommendations to the role of the
Directorate (and the court) in defining charity in
Canada. In resolving this part of the problem,
Drache (1998) suggested creating a specialized
charity body with two parts, one to register new
charities and the other to serve as a tribunal to
adjudicate disputes over registration. A board of
registrars would be responsible for qualifying
applicants as charities, and those denied registration
could appeal to the tribunal, which would hear
submissions from the rejected applicant and any
other interested parties (including the CRA), while
the registrar itself would appear in the nature of
amicus curaie (a friend of the court). Further
appeals would take place in the Tax Court, which
would be entitled to hear oral evidence on the issue.
The Report on the Law of Charities by the
Ontario Law Reform Commission (1996) explicitly
cited the British Charity Commission as an
excellent model but lamented its impossibility in
Canada due to the constitutional difficulties. In the
opinion of the Law Reform Commission, it would
have required a charity body in each province and
instead endorsed change only at the federal level.
However, the Ontario Commission recognized that
such changes could make the entire charitable
registration scheme a function of tax considerations
(and bifurcate the charitable definition along
federal-provincial lines) but suggested that both
risks could be managed.
Another paper, written by Monahan and Roth
(2000), noted that the Commission failed to
consider a quasi-judicial agency composed of
federal and provincial components. While they felt
that a body in which the provinces delegated their
authority over charities would likely be ideal, it was
not politically viable. Instead, they proposed a
narrowly construed organization which was only
responsible for an initial decision as to the
charitable nature of an applicant. 
A Canadian Charities Council: A Fresh
Approach to Reform
It is clear that the need for change in the sector is
understood. Unfortunately, the constitutional
difficulties seem to have stymied any momentum
for meaningful reform. Perhaps momentum could
be developed with a fresh approach to the
constitutional impediment.
Overall Philosophy
It should be understood that despite the widespread
desire for change within the sector, the initial policy
considerations that led to the current system still
exist and should therefore be taken into account in
the design of a new system. Thus, any new model
should include a registration system and a
harmonized set of rules for charities across the
country, yet address the jurisdictional issues, the
disguise of a regulatory system as a registration
system, and the entrusting of the charity system to
the tax administration. And importantly, a new
adjudication process should be developed for
disputes over what qualifies as a charity.
Furthermore, it is equally clear that the new system
must evolve so that charity regulation in Canada is
more comprehensive and flexible, not limited to the
ITA, and administered by a body dedicated to thatmission. It is assumed that the charitable donation
tax credit/deduction system and its receipting
corollaries would remain within the ITA and be
administered by the CRA, but that the regulation of
charities should take place by a new organization
under a different statutory regime. 
Constitutional Jurisdiction
Although resolutions to the current situation have
been suggested periodically by those in the sector, the
constitutional problem seems to have stymied
creativity when designing a potential new system. It
is clear, then, that no fundamental changes can take
place in regulating the sector without some solution
to the underlying constitutional question.
The most obvious answer would be a
constitutional amendment authorizing the federal
government to exercise properly the jurisdiction it
already ostensibly exercises. Although such an
amendment, in and of itself, is only minimally
controversial – coming as it does in an area in which
the provinces do not exert even the jurisdiction they
have – the acrimonious constitutional debates of the
Mulroney era have made any possibility of an
amendment unlikely.
Nevertheless, it bears pointing out that section
94a was added to the Constitution Act, 1867 in order
to include disability and survivor benefits in the
federal pension plan, and although the Canada
Pension Plan Act contains a variety of complex
provisions that allow the provinces to opt out and
create their own pension plans, the fact that a
constitutional amendment was created – albeit in
the 1960s – might give some hope to those in a
position to test the waters for such a change. That
being said, in view of the importance of charities in
delivering provincial services, the federal
government’s assumption of constitutional
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the provinces would
not be desirable, even if it were possible.
Some in the charitable sector look to the creation of
a national securities commission for guidance, but one
should note that the federal government posits that 
it has shared jurisdiction over this area, based on the
trade and commerce provision of the Constitution.
Although the report of the Expert Panel on Securities
Regulation (2009),42 and the coming reference to the
Supreme Court will be of some interest to the
charitable sector, unfortunately the Constitution
contains no analogy of the trade and commerce
provision relevant to charities. 
Could the provinces not simply delegate their powers
to the federal government in order to facilitate
regulation of the charitable sector? Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled such delegation
unconstitutional in a case involving Nova Scotia in
1951.43The Constitution, in its division of powers
section, gives the responsibility for charities to the
provinces, stating that the “Province may exclusively
make laws in relation to…Charities, and
Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province.” It
could be argued, therefore, that a province is limited
to the regulation of a charity so long as the activity
involved falls exclusively within the province, but that
interprovincial regulation is beyond its jurisdiction.
Necessarily, the jurisdiction to regulate the
interprovincial activity of charities should fall within
the powers of the federal government. Moreover, this
would fit within the general scheme of the
Constitution, which gives jurisdiction over issues
affecting more than one province to the federal
government. Of course, if the regulation of national
charities were accepted by the provinces (or the
courts) as within the federal government’s
jurisdiction, there would remain the question of how
to regulate charities that operate only within one
province. I offer a solution to this potential problem
below, but in the age of the Internet the problem
might prove more theoretical than practical – it is
hard to imagine a charity that does not remain at least
open to donations from, if not actually conducting
operations in, more than one province. 
Thus, the federal government arguably does have
some authority to regulate the sector outside of its
42 Chaired by Tom Hockin, former federal minister of finance under Brian Mulroney, the panel was commissioned to explore the possibility of a
national securities regulator. 
43 Nova Scotia (A.G.) v Canada (A.G.), [1951] S.C.R. 31. In this case, the province would have had to delegate certain powers regarding
employment to the federal Parliament and certain taxation powers would be delegated from the federal government to the province to create an
unemployment insurance plan.
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power to register charities. Although use of this
power would mean efficient, federal regulation for
national charities, without provincial cooperation
there would be no new system for those charities that
operate exclusively within one province. Different
methods of cooperation are possible, but they
ultimately would involve some type of mirroring of
the federal regulations to ensure a standardized set of
laws for charities across the country.
As the federal government’s jurisdiction to govern
the sector rests on shaky legal ground, perhaps the
most viable option in terms of creating a standardized
set of charity regulations is a hybrid system, in which
charity regulation and registration would be the
responsibility of a new joint federal-provincial body,
but the tax provisions would be retained in the ITA.
All but the registration provisions in the ITA would
be repealed, and registration under the ITA would be
both contingent and automatic upon registration as a
charity by, a “Canadian Charities Council” composed
of representatives of each province and the federal
government. 
This Council would be structurally similar to
the CRA’s Board of Management. The CRA Board
of Management oversees the organization and
management of the CRA and sets out policies
related to resources, services, property, personnel,
and contracts.44 This Board is composed of 15
members appointed by the federal cabinet but 11
of whom are nominated by the provinces. Most of
these representatives are from the private sector.
Notably, while the Board is answerable to
Parliament through the Minister of National
Revenue (although see below for our comments on
this point in respect of a charity council), it has no
access to confidential taxpayer information and is
not involved in the actual application of the ITA or
its policies. Similarly, the Council here would not
be involved in individual cases but would oversee
the public service machinery necessary to properly
administer the sector. 
Such a Council would require each province to
pass legislation investing the Council with the
authority now invested in the provincial attorneys
general to regulate charities in their province. 
In return, each province would be entitled to
appoint a representative to the Council at its
discretion. It is anticipated that the province would
choose an appointee from the charitable sector and
in this way the input of the sector could be
solicited while maintaining provincial
participation.
Finally, given the often overwhelming
importance of front line experience in regulating
the sector, the federal government should retain
the authority to appoint at least one representative
of the sector to the Council.45 It should be noted
that while the Council would not involve itself in
individual cases, the authority to do so would
devolve from the participation by the provinces on
the Council. Thus, the references below to the
‘Council’ should be taken as references to the
Council in its jurisdictional capacity but not
necessarily the actual council of representatives. 
The provincial delegation of authority to the
Council, would not breach the Supreme Court’s
ruling in the Nova Scotia case, as the provinces
would be delegating, not to the federal
government, but to an independent council. As
Monahan and Roth note: “Of course, it would be
theoretically possible for the Provinces to delegate
their jurisdiction over charities to a national
charity commission. If this were a practical
possibility, there would be a strong case in favour
of transferring to such an agency the entire Federal
jurisdiction over charities as well, including the
power to make the initial determination on
application for registration” (2000, 11). 
The Council could operate so that any province
that did not want to participate would not be
required to do so. However, since registration
under the ITA would be contingent on
registration by the Council, and as the Council
could not register charities in a non-participating
province, charities in an uncooperative province
would not be registered for federal income tax
C.D. Howe Institute
44 Taken from http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/brd/rls-eng.html
45 Of course, in addition to formal involvement, input from the sector can always be sought and may well occur on an ad hoc basis given that
different situations may involve different sensitivities or regional issues.Commentary 300 | 13
purposes. While somewhat heavy handed, this
should be sufficient incentive to induce provincial
participation; it also has the merit of being an
attractive argument from a technical point of
view.46 Moreover it would help standardize the
definition of charity across the provinces,47
encourage a national standard in charity
regulation, harmonize the administration of the
sector over the entire country, and provide greater
legitimacy for regulatory laws than currently
exists. Of course, if none of the provinces opted in
(or if they quit the Council en masse), Parliament
would always retain the right to reintroduce
legislation in the ITA as a requirement of
registration. Clearly, this worst-case (and current)
scenario would happen only if the provinces made
a concerted effort to avoid exerting the
constitutional authority they already have.
Aside from shouldering their constitutional
responsibility in this sector, however, the provinces
should be motivated to become involved because
of their interest in ensuring that charities, which
perform so many duties that would otherwise add
to the financial responsibility of provincial
governments, are being created and administered
properly. Furthermore, since, on every donation,
each province (above a minimum threshold)
foregoes tax revenue at generally equal to the
highest marginal tax credit in that province, one
would expect the provinces to want to ensure that
such funds were spent properly.
The Need for Independence
A common theme of the Broadbent Report (1999),
the Joint Regulatory Tables report (1999), and the
papers by Drache (1998) and Drache and Hunter
(2000) is that any new charity entity be
“independent” – that is, free from government
interference. As Drache and Hunter point out, there
are two types of independence: accountability within
our system of government, and independence in the
manner in which appointments are made within a
body such as the proposed Council.
With respect to the first type of independence, I
essentially concur with Drache and Hunter – though
their recommendation is solely in the context of a
charity tribunal – that, ideally, the Council should
not report to any minister but instead should issue
an annual report to Parliament and (I would add) to
the provincial legislatures.48 Such independence
would inoculate the Council from any government
interference that might tend to push the
administration of charities into the political realm,
and it should allow the Council to handle politically
difficult cases in an impartial manner.49
With respect to independence regarding
appointments to the Council, this likely would be
the subject of negotiation between the provinces
and the federal government, but I expect that,
ultimately, provinces would appoint their own
representatives. 
The Structure of the Council
The Council would be structured into three sections:
one that deals exclusively with the definition of
charity and the registration of new charities, a second
that is devoted specifically to charity regulation and a
third that is an internal tribunal.
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46 Unfortunately, convincing the provinces to become involved might be difficult. Charities bring in no wealth, and the regulation of charities is simply not
a politically hot topic, the occasional news report involving a high-profile charity notwithstanding. On the other hand, the provinces seem continually to
miss the point that, although charities do detract from the provincial tax base, they assume responsibilities that would otherwise be left to provincial
handling. Considering their lack of interest in seizing their jurisdiction in this area, the provinces would have a difficult time justifying opposition to a
plan that would improve governance of the sector and involve only a limited commitment on their part. Even Ontario, the province with the greatest
independent presence in the sector, could scarcely raise an objection to a plan to give its current infrastructure additional reach and power.
47 Technically, as the Constitution places charity regulation within provincial jurisdiction, it was intended that each province would define “charity”
individually. Thus, unless steps are taken to harmonize definitions, left to the common law they could vary substantially among the provinces.
48 This model seems to be working well for the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, which is statutorily required to report to the federal
minister of finance and the appropriate provincial ministers. See Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, S.C. 1997, c. 40, s. 50.
49 There is a current perception that the Directorate does not have the political will to be seen revoking the charitable status of popular charities.| 14 Commentary 300
THE REGISTRATION SECTION: The purpose of the
registration section of the proposed Council would
be to approve the registration of charities and to
consider novel extensions of the definition to new
types of organizations, supported by legal
precedents in Canada or other common law
jurisdictions. The section could also be mandated
to consider the broad social climate in which the
proposed extension of the definition was being
made. One imagines that, for the most part, this
new division would operate in a similar manner as
the current Directorate. In fact, if the proposed
Council were established, the transfer of
Directorate staff and operations responsible for
regulations would likely be the appropriate first step
in creating the registration section. As an entity
distinct from the CRA, however, the new section
would register or deregister organizations in
accordance with the law and social policy, free from
any of the tax authority’s directives or policies.
Moreover, as career advancement would not
depend on a transfer from the Council, a wealth of
experience might be created, nurtured, and
sustained there for the benefit of the sector. 
THE CHARITY REGULATION SECTION: The Council’s
second section would be mandated to promulgate
the rules needed to regulate charities more generally.
When removed from the context of the registration
regime, rules on, for example, related business,
political activity, and excess business holding likely
would become more detailed and comprehensive,
allowing for nuanced legislation and a variety of
possible penalties for both the charity and its
directors. Furthermore, the Council should pass
rules that are not currently in the ITA to fulfill the
provincial responsibility to protect charitable
property and to provide national contiguity in rules
relating to such issues as fundraising, telemarketing,
operating during disasters, operating overseas, and
other issues of concern.
Among other benefits, a charities regulation
section would bestow a constitutional legitimacy on
the Council’s decisions that those of the CRA now
lack. From a technical perspective, one would
imagine that the Council would draft new
regulations or policies – akin to the authoritative
pronouncements of Ontario Securities Commission
– and publish them to the sector. Compliance with
these regulations would be a mandatory condition
of registration with the Council – and therefore
under the ITA as well. The Council presumably
would employ a group of individuals to audit and
enforce the rules and to work in conjunction with
the provinces to monitor Canadian charities
effectively. Ideally, the legislation currently
contained in the ITA would be duplicated on a
more comprehensive basis and supplemented with
laws that, in fact, would assert provincial
jurisdiction over the protection of charitable
property. The Council would also have the added
benefit of being able to take delicate, nuanced, and
timely approaches to issues facing the sector.
THE INTERNALTRIBUNAL SECTION: Applicants whose
proposals for registration are rejected, or charities with
regulation disputes, should be able to appeal the
decision to an internal tribunal, a system that is being
used with considerable success in England as part of
the Charity Commission. As to the fundamentals of
such a tribunal section, Drache and Hunter (2000, 14)
note that “[t]he core to the concept of a Canadian
charity Tribunal is that it would be in a position to
interpret the common law (as does the English version)
and any legislative initiatives from an independent
perspective, rather than from within a framework that
gives priority to the collection of taxes.”
The tribunal should not act as a formal court body
but be composed of specialized tribunal adjudicators
with experience in law and the social context in which
charities operate. Moreover, it should have the political
authority to extend the common law definition of
charity, rather than simply implementing CRA policy.
In some ways, the tribunal would fall somewhere
between the Charities Redress Section of the Appeals
Branch process on the one hand and the Federal
Court of Appeal on the other. Tribunal members
could conduct hearings around the country, in a
somewhat informal manner that allows self-
represented applicants to use oral testimony and
relaxed rules of evidence to present their case for
charitable status. The tribunal could also hear from
intervenors, including members of the public, the
CRA, and the registration branch of the Council. As a
matter of course, its decisions should be published.
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Appeals of tribunal decisions should be returned
to the provincial Superior Courts for a new hearing.
These courts are well suited to expedite different
types of litigation in a more cost-effective manner
than the Federal Court of Appeal. Furthermore, in
a lower court trial, a judge would be able to
evaluate all the evidence, including oral evidence,
rather than simply review the record. Provincial
Superior Courts are already used for complex
litigation and are familiar with the procedures and
administration needed to handle these types of
cases, especially within the related matters of trusts
and estate litigation. It would also accomplish an
objective of the Joint Regulatory Table (1999) by
accelerating the speed at which case law is
generated, which would be of benefit to all
charities.50
Clearly, this would place an additional burden on
provincial resources, but one might argue that it is
hardly inappropriate given that returning charity
litigation to the provincial courts is in keeping with
the original intention of the Fathers of
Confederation. Indeed, as the Council would act
with the authority of the provincial attorneys
general, it would be entirely appropriate to refer
disputes to the provincial courts. Moreover, as the
Council would be responsible for implementing a
system of charity regulation outside the general tax
collection regime, it would be inappropriate to
return such appeals to the Tax Court as
contemplated in previous reports. 
THE ROLES OFTHE CRA AND DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE: Under the proposed system, the CRA’s
role in administering charities – but not its main
function as the protector of the tax base – would
end. This would have the dual effect of maintaining
a registration system for income tax purposes while
still giving the CRA authority to attack tax
schemes, which invariably are based on a charity’s
right to issue tax receipts. Registration under the
ITA would be automatic upon registration by the
Council, so the CRA would no longer have the
conflicted responsibility of maintaining the tax base
and administering socially based non-taxable
entities. Simply put, the CRA would revert to an
organization whose specific purpose is to collect
taxes. Nevertheless, the CRA and the Department
of Finance would retain the crucial role of
maintaining the integrity of the receipting system,
which likely would lead to their having a continued
consulting relationship with the Council to ensure
that the entire system worked harmoniously.
Conclusion
No system of regulation can ever be perfect, but it is
clear and widely agreed that changes are long
overdue to the current regime of charity regulation.
Unfortunately, significant political will is required to
overcome the inertia on reform whenever
constitutional difficulties accompany the issue. There
is always the possibility that the federal government
could force the provinces to act simply by refusing to
register new organizations unless they participate in
the new regime. It would be far better, however, if
the provinces worked with the federal government,
the sector, and interested parties to find a way to
exert the authority that is constitutionally theirs in
any case. Indeed, if all the actors behaved as they are
supposed to under the Constitution, Canada’s system
of regulation could only strengthen Canadian
charities and the work they do.
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